Dialectical Federalism: A Tribute to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals by Nichol, Gene R.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1987
Dialectical Federalism: A Tribute to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
Gene R. Nichol
Copyright c 1987 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Nichol, Gene R., "Dialectical Federalism: A Tribute to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals" (1987). Faculty Publications.
Paper 907.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/907
DIALECTICAL FEDERALISM: 
A TRIBUTE TO THE WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME 
COURT OF APPEALS 
GENE R. NICHOL* 
Over the course of the past decade, the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals has become something of a controversial insti-
tution. Allegedly seeking to ''mold state government in its own im-
age,'' 1 the court has issued decisions restructuring the state property 
tax assessment and appraisal scheme,2 overseeing the funding of pub-
lic education,3 . invalidating a gubernatorial veto,4 expanding tort 
claims beyond the umbrella of workers compensation,5 and ordering 
emergency care for the homeless.6 As a result, the high court has, 
perhaps deservedly, "attained a reputation for dramatic intervention 
in public policy disputes. " 7 
As individual exercises of judicial authority, the court's deter-
minations have received ample attention. Institutional and political 
conservatives have claimed that the justices have stepped beyond 
their allotted powers, trumped the prerogatives of other organs of 
governments, thwarted commercial development, and fostered bad 
policies in the process. Liberals and activists, perhaps less frequently, 
have complained that the court's efforts have been tempered by the 
political winds and thus fall short of the egalitarian goals occa-
sionally suggested in its opinions.8 
* Gene R. Nichol, Cutler Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, College 
of William & Mary. Bob Bastress offered a number of helpful suggestions which worked their way 
into this comment. 
' Charleston Gazette, Jan. I, 1984, at 1B, col. 5. 
2 Killen v. Logan County Comm'n, 295 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1982). 
' Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979). 
• State ex rei. Bd. of Educ. v. Rockefeller, 167 W. Va. 72, 281 S.E.2d 131 (1981). 
' Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978). 
6 Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (\V. Va. 1983). 
1 Hagan, Policy Activism in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 1930-1985, 89 W. 
VA. L. REv. 149, 149 (1986). 
• Consider, for example, the tone and flourish of the Court's opinions in UMWA v. Parsons, 
305 S.E.2d 343 (\V. Va. 1983); Major v. DeFrench, 169 W. Va. 241, 286 S.E.2d 688 (1982); Webb 
v. Fury, 167 W. Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28 (1981); Pushinsky v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 
164 W. Va. 736, 266 S.E.2d 444 (1980). 
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It is not my purpose here to enter that debate. Instead, this brief 
comment will consider the work of the court from another direction. 
My focus will be the contribution to the development of American 
constitutional decisionmaking resulting from the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals' efforts to interpret its own constitution. 
It is, as Justice Brandeis claimed, "one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous State may . . . serve as 
a laboratory"9 for the formulation of governmental policy. As the 
result of an increasing reticence by the United States Supreme Court 
and a heightened sensitivity to civil liberties issues by state jurists, 
the cast of players molding our constitutional structure has been 
substantially expanded. The resulting dialogue, spurred by both state 
and federal interpretive ventures, has bolstered the legitimacy and 
the precision of constitutional decisionmaking. 
The rulings of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals which 
construe the provisions of the state constitution, therefore, have spe-
cial significance not only in the lives of West Virginians but in the 
development of a national constitutional jurisprudence. My task is 
to examine a handful of cases in which the West Virginia court has 
read its own constitution as more demanding than the federal coun-
terpart. Along the way, I think something can be learned about the 
constitutional issues which should be particularly appealing to state 
tribunals, and about the role that state judiciaries, if inclined, can 
play in our constitutional process. Before turning to the West Vir-
ginia decisions, however, some perspective is helpful. 
I. THE IMP ACT oF UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT 
DECISIONMAKING 
Our constitutional memories are often short. In an era of alleged 
overconstitutionalization, it is easy to forget that a mere three dec-
ades ago little of our present framework for the protection of con-
stitutional liberties was in place. On the heels of Brown v. Board 
of Education, 10 the Warren Court launched a virtual constitutional 
• New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
10 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)(separate but equal impermissible in public 
education). 
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revolution. In fairly rapid succession, decisions were handed down 
not only combatting racial discrimination on a number of fronts 11 
but also requiring the reapportionment of legislatures, 12 the incor-
poration of the bulk of the provisions of the Bill of Rights against 
the states, 13 giving more meaningful content to the First Amend-
ment's speech and press guarantees, 14 protecting voting rights, pro-
hibiting orchestrated public school prayer, 15 assuring some measure 
of judicial access to the poor, 16 and bolstering the demands of pro-
cedural due process. 17 Faced with an avalanche of mandated change, 
it is perhaps unsurprising that state supreme courts tended to react 
defensively. Many judges, no doubt, disagreed with the Warren Court 
agenda. But regardless of the predilections of local jurists, merely 
keeping up was a substantial hardship. It was easy, especially in 
criminal cases, to embrace the habit of looking no further than the 
announced demands of federal constitutional law. 
While the Burger Court accomplished no true counter-revolu-
tion,18 by the mid-1970s the tenor of United States Supreme Court 
decisionmaking had changed. Fewer new categories of constitutional 
review were recognized, 19 and existing guarantees were pared back.20 
These substantive retrenchments were accompanied by the adoption 
of a variety of jurisdictional principles making access to the federal 
courts more difficult. The standing barrier was solidified, relegating 
11 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 
u.s. 715 (1961). 
12 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
" See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145 (1968) Gury trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Malloy 
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to 
counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (search and seizure). 
14 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
" Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
16 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel for indigent criminal defendant). 
17 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
18 See V. BLASI, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (1983). 
19 But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender dis-
crimination). 
20 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (showing of intent required in racial discrim-
ination cases); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (de facto segregation not unconstitutional); 
San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (fundamental rights analysis cur-
tailed). 
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agressive suitors to state tribunals.21 The Younger doctrine was fash-
ioned to assure that pending state cases would actually be tried in 
that forum.22 Finally, habeas corpus review, a mainstay of the War-
ren Court's supervisory process, was dramatically curtailed.23 Ac-
cordingly, state judiciaries were given a freer hand to conduct criminal 
trials. In broad terms, the Burger Court's message was different than 
that of its predecessor. While the Warren Court seemed willing to 
surmount any potential hurdle to assure constitutional compliance, 
the Burger Court often implied that the federal judiciary had strayed 
beyond its competence and that states should be left to run their 
own houses.24 
A handful of state courts took the implied challenge seriously. 25 
The California Supreme Court, for example, confirmed the ''in-
dependent nature of the [guarantees of] the California Constitu-
tion. " 26 The New Jersey high court similarly concluded that the 
provisions of the New Jersey Constitution "should be interpreted 
to give ... greater protection" than their federal counterpartsY It 
was in this context, aided by a substantial change in membership,28 
21 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1974) (demanding distinct and palpable injury). See gen-
erally Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 68 (1984). 
22 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Nichol, Federalism, State Courts and Section 
1983, 73 VA. L. REv. __ (forthcoming). 
"' See, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
"" See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). 
I should add, however, that the Burger Court occasionally ran against this current. 
In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 132 (1983) the Court fashioned a jurisdictional doctrine 
which is more interventionist than preceeding principles. Long's adequate and independent 
state ground rule demands that local courts indicate "clearly and expressly" that federal 
law does not compel the result in order to avoid Supreme Court review. /d. at 1041. Of 
course the adequate and independent ground doctrine comes into play primarily when state 
courts have chosen to provide more stringent guarantees than the federal constitution de-
mands. Long apparently indicates that "federalism is not a value to be pursued when state 
courts have afforded their citizens too much constitutional protection." See Nichol, An Ac-
tivism of Ambivalence, 98 HARv. L. REv. 315, 321 n.39 (1984). But see, Althouse, How 
to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1485 
(1987). 
25 See generally, Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 
62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976). 
26 People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 114, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368 (1976). 
27 State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54, 346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (1975). See also, Brennan, State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977). 
28 Hagan, supra note 7 at 151 & 164. 
1987] DIALECTICAL FEDERALISM 95 
that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals began to apply 
its constitution in earnest. 
II. INTERPRETING THE WEST VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION 
Across a broad spectrum of civil and criminal constitutional is-
sues, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has concluded 
that the "West Virginia Constitution offers limitations on the power 
of the state . . . more stringent than those imposed . . . by the Con-
stitution of the United States. " 29 It is not my intention to catalogue 
those limitations, to discover the common themes of the court's 
work, or to characterize the overall quality of the judicial product. 
It is, instead, to emphasize categories of cases-illustrated by fea-
tures of key West Virginia decisions - in which independent state 
constitutional decisionmaking has proven particularly useful. So 
considered, the work of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
represents a notable contribution to the development of constitu-
tional jurisprudence. 
A. Filtering Out Federalism 
It is perhaps true that it never makes sense for a state supreme 
court to reflexively accept United States Supreme Court doctrine as 
the outer judicial boundary of the protection of individual rights. 
Whether or not so sweeping a statement can be sustained, it is clear 
that federal constitutional guidelines should not provide the final 
word for state courts when those standards are heavily influenced 
by federalism concerns. If the federal judiciary refrains from in-
tervention in particular arenas out of deference to local decision-
makers, state judges should hardly follow in lockstep. 
Consider, for example, the landmark ruling in San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez.30 There, Mexican-American 
v West Virginia Citizens Action Group, Inc. v. Daley, 324 S.E.2d 713, 725 (W. Va. 1984). See 
also, UMWA v. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d 343 (W.Va. 1983); Webb v. Fury, 167 W.Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 
28 (1981); Peters v. Narick, 165 W. Va. 622, 270 S.E.2d 760 (1980); Pushinsky v. West Virginia Bd. 
of Law Examiners, 164 W. Va. 736, 266 S.E.2d 444 (1980); Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc. v. 
Mingo County Comm'n, 164 W. Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d 165 (1979); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 
255 S.E.2d 859 (1979). 
30 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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parents of schoolchildren challenged the dramatically disparate per-
pupil funding resulting from the Texas school finance system. The 
United States Supreme Court rejected the claim, ruling that the right 
to education is not "fundamental" for purposes of equal protection 
scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment.31 Justice Powell's opinion 
for the Court explained that "[i]t is not the province of this Court 
to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaran-
teeing equal protection of the laws. " 32 That conclusion was thought 
mandated, however, by the need to scrutinize state action under 
"judical principles sensitive to the nature of ... the rights reserved 
to the states under the [federal] Constitution. " 33 
Given those premises, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals correctly refused to follow the federal lead in deciding Pauley 
v. Kelly. 34 Lincoln County public school students challenged unequal 
expenditures under the State Board of Education funding scheme 
in Pauley. While recognizing that Rodriguez foreclosed a traditional 
equal protection claim, the West Virginia high court concluded that 
it was "not constrained by the federal constitutional standard. " 35 
Emphasizing the demand in Article XII, section one of the West 
Virginia Constitution for a "thorough and efficient" system of pub-
lic schools, Pauley declared education to be a fundamental right, 
meriting the closest judicial scrutiny. 36 Accordingly, the ''woefully 
inadequate'' Lincoln County schools were said to fall short of the 
constitutional mark.37 
Rodriguez, of course, is something of a sore thumb in equal 
protection jurisprudence. If the primary value served by the equal 
protection mandate is equality of opportunity, Rodriguez certainly 
presents a strong case for judicial intervention. If one is not born 
rich, education is the very foundation of opportunity in the United 
States, and money has a substantial effect on the quality of one's 
" /d. at 35. 
32 /d. at 33. 
" /d. at 39. 
,. Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979). 
" /d. at 679, 255 S.E.2d at 864. 
36 /d. at 708, 255 S.E.2d at 878. 
37 /d. at 707, 255 S.E.2d at 878. 
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education. A public school system, like that involved in Rodriguez, 
which results in tremendous disparities of per pupil expenditure, 
cannot be readily squared with a serious demand for equality. If 
Rodriguez is defensible, then, it is so only on practical grounds. 
Given the weighty demands of school desegration, prison reform, 
and criminal procedure supervision, the school funding conundrum 
was perhaps more than the federal judiciary could reasonably be 
asked to bear. But it hardly makes sense for a state court to accept 
the harm to equality which Rodriguez, one assumes reluctantly, was 
forced to embrace. 
The United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the pro-
cedural due process mandate have given rise to similar problems. 
Decisions since the mid-1970's have frequently employed both 
cramped and convoluted definitions of the "liberty" and "property" 
interests needed to trigger procedural protection.38 Paul v. Davis,39 
for example, butchered precedent40 to conclude that no liberty in-
terest was implicated by a governmental scheme which listed the 
plaintiff, picture included, as an "active shoplifter" on a flyer dis-
tributed to some 800 merchants.41 Bishop v. Wood,42 on the other 
hand, held that a "permanent employee" who, under local ordi-
nance, could be dismissed only for "adequate grounds,"had no 
property interest in the continued enjoyment of his job.43 The driving 
force behind both decisions was federalism. Paul characterized the 
reputational interest as one "which the State may protect against 
injury by virtue of its tort law. " 44 Bishop turned on judicial re-
luctance to convert federal courts into ''. . . the appropriate forum 
in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions made daily" 
by such state agencies. 45 
" See, Monaghan, Of Liberty and Property, 62 CoRNELL L. REv. 401, 405 (1977). 
'
9 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
40 It is impossible to square Paul with Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) and 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
•• Paul, 424 U.S. at 697-700. 
42 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) . 
., /d. at 347. 
44 Paul, 424 U.S. at 712. 
•• Bishop, 426 U.S. at 349. 
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Given this manipulation of fourteenth amendment doctrine in 
order to afford deference to local officials, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals has correctly taken a broader view of con-
stitutional "liberty" and "property." In Major v. DeFrench46 the 
justices determined that a public employee discharge, which was fac-
tually similar to that involved in Bishop v. Wood, presented ap-
propriately cognizable liberty and property interests.47 DeFrench held 
that even a probationary employee enjoys procedural safeguards un-
der West Virginia law, and that the "pursuit of a lawful occupation" 
is a constitutional liberty interest. 48 It remains to be seen whether 
these bold procedural pronouncements will stand the test of time. 49 
But the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was certainly right 
to search for answers beyond the perimeters of a federal standard 
which is designed, in no small measure, to limit federal interference 
with state prerogative. The tensions which shape federal principles 
are not always applicable to the development of state constitutional 
law. State supreme courts should work to purge their decisions of 
federalism concerns which they do not share. 
B. Deficient Federal Standards 
It is readily apparent that, in some particulars, federal consti-
tutional standards lack both consistency and coherence. Of course, 
unclear or not, decisions of the United States Supreme Court an-
nounce the law of the land;50 and federal determinations provide a 
floor of constitutional protection which state judiciaries must meet. 51 
If, however, a state supreme court is willing to read its constitution 
as a stronger safeguard of personal liberties than its national coun-
terpart, the adequate and independent state ground doctrine shields 
the state ruling from federal review.52 The autonomous interpretation 
... Major v. DeFrench, 169 W. Va. 241, 286 S.E.2d 688 (1982) . 
., /d. at 251-57, 286 S.E.2d at 695-98. 
" !d. at 254, 286 S.E.2d at 696. 
•• See, for example, the curtailed liberty definitions in Orteza v. Monongalia County Gen. Hosp., 
318 S.E.2d 40 (W. Va. 1984) and Freeman v. Poling, 338 S.E.2<i 415 (W. Va. 1985). 
so That remains the case, fortunately, whether the Attorney General of the United States agrees 
with the rulings or not. 
51 See, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
52 See, Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 {1965). See also, H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION: POLICY & PRACTICE 851-67 {1984). 
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of state constitutional provisions provides an opportunity for state 
courts to avoid the unsteadying influence of faulty federal consti-
tutional standards. When faced with a troubled federal rule, it makes 
sense for state courts to turn to their own charters. Again, the work 
of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is instructive. 
Peters v. Narick53 is a good example. There the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals invalidated West Virginia's gender-biased 
separate maintenance statute which required, in appropriate circum-
stances, a "husband . . . to provide suitable support for his wife. " 54 
The outcome of the case was hardly a surprise. The United States 
Supreme Court had struck down a similar provision under the fed-
eral constitution only the year before. 55 What was surprising was 
the methodology the court chose to employ. Declaring itself ''un-
impressed'' with the ''middle tier approach'' commonly employed 
in the federal sex discrimination cases, the justices decided the case 
under Article III, section 17 of the West Virginia Constitution.56 
Pointing to a "long-standing and comprehensive system" of sex dis-
crimination, the court concluded that gender classifications "are to 
be regarded as suspect, [and] accorded the strictest possible judicial 
scrutiny." 57 
Justice McGraw's opinion in Peters criticized the federal "im-
portant governmental objectives," dating from Craig v. Boren,58 for 
being "result oriented. " 59 I'm not sure that is the adjective I would 
have chosen - no constitutional standard is more "outcome de-
terminative" than the compelling state interest test which the court 
chose to embrace. But if the court's concern was that the important 
government interest standard would prove to be too manipulable to 
foster predictable decision-making, Peters was clearly prescient. 
'
3 Peters v. Narick, 165 W. Va. 622, 270 S.E.2d 760 (1980). 
,. W. VA. CooE § 48-2-28 (1976). 
" See, Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
06 Peters, 165 W. Va. at 630, 270 S.E.2d at 764. Article III, section 17 reads, in pertinent part, 
"every person shall have remedy by due course of law." 
" /d. at 634, 270 S.E.2d at 766. 
•• Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)(gender classifications must be based on "important gov-
ernment interests and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.") 
•• Peters, 165 W. Va. at 630, 270 S.E.2d at 764. 
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• 
The most glaring problem with the important government in-
terest-middle tier-standard is its studied ambiguity on the means-
end scrutiny it demands. Under its terms, gender-biased statutes must 
be "substantially related" to the achievement of important govern-
ment ends. Since the court has not defined "substantial," however, 
the standard has been subjected to intense interpretive maneuvering. 
In Michael M. v. Superior Court, for example, the United States 
Supreme Court accepted a tenuous relationship to a contrived gov-
ernmental interest to justify the constitutionality of California's gen-
der-biased statutory rape law. 60 And in the male-only draft registration 
case, Rostker v. Goldberg,61 the Court read the gender standard so 
deferentially that no elevated review was thought necessary. The 
result of all this is that no one has a clue what the federal gender 
standard actually is. While Justices Brennan and O'Connor apply 
the test stringently, in the hands of Chief Justice Rehnquist it is 
hard to imagine a statute that would fall short of the standard's 
demands.62 Fortunately for lawyers and government officials charged 
with measuring the requisites of equality, West Virginia avoided this 
wrong turn with the opinion in Peters. 
Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc. v. Mingo County Commis-
sion, 63 though not a civil liberties case, provides a second example. 
There a group of taxpayers challenged the taxing and assessment of 
various third-party properties. When faced with a claim that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals, based on Article III, section 14 of the state constitution, ruled 
that "every taxpayer, every person affected by the tax base, has a 
financial interest in seeing that all property in the district [is] prop-
"' Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). The California statute was apparently 
designed to foster female chastity and to carry out a presumption that minor females-unlike their 
male counterparts-cannot consent to sexual intercourse. Moreover, even if one accepts California's 
latter day statement of legislative purpose-prevention of teenage pregnancy-the statute was not a 
reasonable method (compared with a gender neutral statute) to carry out that interest. 
•• Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
62 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (O'Conner, J.); 
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)(Rehnquist, J.); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976)(Brennan, J .). 
63 Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc. v. Mingo County Comm'n, 164 W. Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d 
165 (1979). 
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erly taxed. " 64 As a result, the West Virginia Constitution has been 
read to provide an extremely liberal, and extremely clear, rule on 
taxpayer standing. Unfortunately, the same can hardly be said of 
the United States Supreme Court. 
Federal taxpayer standing guidelines date from the 1968 decision 
in Flast v. Cohen. 65 There, in a remarkably unpersuasive opinion, 
the Court concluded that federal taxpayers have a sufficient "per-
sonal stake'' to challenge expenditures66 if the statute attacked is an 
exercise of the spending power, and if the government action al-
legedly violated a specific constitutional limitation. 67 Of course, for 
decades it has been difficult to understand why a taxpayer's "per-
sonal stake'' varies so dramatically depending on the nature of the 
claim on the merits and on whether the government action can be 
classified as an expenditure.68 To make matters worse, in Valley 
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation. of 
Church & State,69 the Court interpreted the Flast test in an almost 
comically literalistic fashion, ruling that the donation of real prop-
erty, even real property worth a half million dollars, is not an "ex-
penditure'' which will support standing. 70 
This judicial slalom is hardly one to make the United States 
Supreme Court proud. Federal decisions exploring the contours of 
the case or controversy requirement of Article III, however, are not 
binding on the state courts. The states are free to fashion their own 
concepts of justiciability. Given that, and given the federal courts' 
poor record of performance in the area, any state determination to 
blindly embrace the federal path is unwarranted. The Tug Valley 
decision offers a preferable alternative for state judiciaries seeking 
64 Id. at 104, 261 S.E.2d at 171. 
6
' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
66 The same principles seem to apply, at the federal level, for any sort of taxpayer challenge -
except to one's own tax bill. See, United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
67 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-05. 
"" See, Justice Harlan's dissent in Flast, 392 U.S. at 116-33. See also Nichol, Injury and the 
Disintegration of Article Ill, 14 CALIF. L. REv. 1915 (1987). 
•• Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 
u.s. 464 (1982). 
70 Id. at 489. See generally Nichol, Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley 
Forge, 61 N.C.L. REv. 798 (1983). 
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to open their doors under comprehensible guidelines of justiciability. 
C. Into the Breach 
A final category of state constitutional decisions I want to em-
phasize is more easily characterized. There are, perhaps surprisingly, 
substantial areas of constitutional conflict which have not been di-
rectly addressed by decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 71 
Accordingly, state supreme courts and federal circuit courts have 
greater liberty to fashion what they deem to be appropriate rules 
of decision. Of course the easy, and perhaps traditional, response 
by state tribunals to either ambiguity or a clean slate at the federal 
level has been to deny the constitutional challenge. Unless clearly 
forced, the theory seemingly goes, state courts will reject the claim 
of constitutional right. 
As the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and other en-
ergetic state judiciaries have shown, however, another response is 
not only possible, but strongly suggested by our federal system. Like 
the judges of the federal circuits, state supreme court justices can 
contribute to the national dialogue through which constitutional jur-
isprudence is molded. As indicated, a state court's interpretation of 
its constitution can, in the proper circumstance, delimit the law of 
the jurisdiction free from federal oversight. With a well constructed 
opinion, it is also possible for a state tribunal to reach beyond its 
boundaries and affect the development of constitutional decision-
making in other fora. Consider these illustrations. 
In Webb v. Fury the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
became one of the first tribunals in the nation to offer greater pro-
tection for the right to petition the government than has been af-
71 One ready example is the panoply of issues naturally spawned by the United States Supreme 
Court's privacy decision. For the most part, the Court has left the development of the doctrine to 
state and inferior federal courts. See Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1980)(use 
of laetrile); Alaska v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978) (use of cocaine); People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 
2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969) (motorcycle helmet laws). But see Hardwick v. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. 
2841 (1986). 
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forded to communications under the free speech clause.72 The Webb 
decision arose from a libel suit filed by DLM Coal Co. against a 
Braxton County environmentalist. DLM sought a huge damage award 
in circuit court as "compensation" for statements made by Webb 
to the Environmental Protection Agency and the Office of Surface 
Mining concerning DLM's operations. Issuing a writ of prohibition, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals prevented the libel suit 
from proceeding to trial.73 In an opinion by Justice McGraw, the 
court held that Webb's statements represented the exercise of "a 
clear constitutional right and [do] not give rise to a cause of action 
for damages. " 74 Borrowing from a line of federal antitrust decisions, 
the justices held that statements directed to government officers are 
protected by Article III, section 16 of the West Virginia Constitution 
unless they are shown to be '"a mere sham to cover what is actually 
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly"' with the plain-
tiff's business relations.75 Accordingly, even an allegation of actual 
malice, sufficient to overcome free speech and press protections in 
the libel context,76 would not sustain DLM's cause of action.77 
The Webb decision has not gone unnoticed by other courts strug-
gling with the boundaries of the right to petition. The District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals relied on Webb to fashion an aggressive 
protection of petition rights in Myers v. Plan Takoma. Inc.18 And 
n Webb v. Fury, 167 W. Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28 (1981). In fairness, I should say that my 
former colleagues Bob Bastress, Chuck DiSalvo and I represented Rick Webb. My impartality on this 
case, therefore, may be subject to question. 
" Id. at 441-43, 282 S.E.2d 39-44. 
74 !d. at 451, 282 S.E.2d at 39. 
" Id. at 443-48, 282 S.E.2d at 35 (quoting Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)). 
76 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). DLM also sued Webb for statements, 
allegedly defamatory, contained in a newsletter distributed by Mountain Streams Monitors. Webb, 
167 W. Va. at 456, 282 S.E.2d at 42. The newsletter references, since they were not directed solely 
to government officials, obviously fit less neatly under the petition umbrella. The court concluded, 
however, that the statements in the newsletter "come within the immunity conferred" by the right 
to petition. Id. at 456, 282 S.E.2d 42. The majority emphasized that the letter was an "exhortation 
to the public" designed to influence "passage and enforcement of laws". Id. That, combined with 
the apparent belief that suit libel suit was based on an "exchange of ideas which is more properly 
within the political arena than in the courthouse led to the dismissal of all counts." Justice Neeley 
dissented on the point. Id. at 461, 282 S.E.2d at 45. 
77 Webb, 167 W. Va. 456-59, 282 S.E.2d at 42-43. 
78 Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc. 472 A.2d 44, 46-7 (D.C. 1983). 
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the Maryland courts have adopted a near absolute petition right, 79 
again based on Webb. The Eighth Circuit recently discussed the 
Webb ruling extensively, and agreed with Justice Neely's dissenting 
opinion that it "overstates the reach" of the petition right.8° Finally, 
two years ago in McDonald v. Smith,81 the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that, under the federal constitution, ''First Amend-
ment rights are inseparable ... and there is no sound basis for grant-
ing greater constitutional protection to statements made in a 
petition ... than other First Amendment protections."82 The Mc-
Donald Court did not discuss Webb. The district and circuit court 
decisions below, however, had weighed the pros and cons of the 
Webb ruling in the balance. 83 It is my guess that the last word has 
not yet been written on the scope of the petition right, and Webb 
will play a major role in the doctrine's development. 84 
An even more significant indication of the impact state consti-
tutional decisionmaking can have on the federal adjudicative process 
is demonstrated by West Virginia Citizens Action Group v. Daley. 85 
Daley examined the constitutionality of a Fairmont ordinance which 
prohibited charitable residential solicitation from sunset to 9 a.m.86 
The city argued that the provision served the dual goals of crime 
prevention and privacy. The Daley opinion measured the relation-
79 See Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59 (1983); Bass v. Rohr, 57 Md. App. 
609, 471 A.2d 752 (1984). 
80 In re IBP Confidential Business Documents Litig., 755 F.2d 1300, 1311-12 (8th Cir. 1985). 
•• McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985). 
82 /d. at 485. 
" See Smith v. McDonald, 562 F. Supp. 829, 842 (M.D.N.C. 1983); Smith v. McDonald 737 
F.2d 427-28 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984) . 
.. McDonald only clearly rejected the notion of an absolute petition right, which Webb had 
rejected as well. Although the Supreme Court saw "no sound basis" to distinguish between speech 
and petition rights, there are distinctions to be drawn between the two activities. Petitioning com-
munications, unlike statements in the press (the typical libel claim), are not immediately distributed 
to the public at large. The nature of the harm inflicted, therefore, can not only be different in kind, 
but the government official receiving the petition can act as a buffer to eliminate the further dis-
tribution of a libelous allegation. The difference may not be enough to warrant an absolute privilege. 
But it may serve as the basis for a stronger protection than is offered under the speech and press 
clauses. 
"' West Virginia Citizens Action Group, Inc. v. Daley, 324 S.E.2d 713 (\V. Va. 1984). 
86 The Daley court also found the "sun set" terminology employed in the statute to be im-
permissibly vague. /d. at 721. The court's discussion of the constitutionality of an ordinance which 
prohibits evening (weekday) solicitation, therefore, is dicta. 
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ship between these laudable aims, the Fairmont ordinance, and the 
demands of free speech and association. 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to outline directly the 
method for determining the constitutionality of such a content-neu-
tral, time, place, and manner solicitation regulation. Shortly before 
Daley was decided, however, the Third Circuit had upheld a similar 
statute in Pennsvlvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of 
Borough of Munhall. 87 While acknowledging the act's impact upon 
protected expression, the Third Circuit reasoned that the solicitation 
ban was closely tied to legitimate governmental interests and that 
it left open ample alternative channels of communication. 88 
In Daley, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
rejected the Third Circuit approach. Justice McGraw's opinion for 
the court argued that by focusing only on the ordinance's goals and 
the availability of other channels of expression, the methodology 
employed in Pennsvlvania Alliance ignored the existence of alter-
natives which would accomplish much of the provision's agenda 
without so significantly burdening speech. 89 Registration of canvas-
sers, fraud and trespass prosecutions, and forced compliance with 
"no solicitation" signs were cited as available means to accomplish 
crime prevention and the protection of the home without inflicting 
the dramatic impact on protected expression which flows from a 
dusk to dawn proscription. Moreover, the court added that Article 
III, section 3 of the West Virginia Constitution "offers limitations 
on the power of the state to inquire into lawful associations and 
speech more stringent than those imposed by the Constitution of 
the United States. " 90 Accordingly, ordinances "which do not permit 
some evening activity during the week impermissibly impinge 
upon ... free speech rights."91 
The following year the Seventh Circuit was faced with yet an-
other solicitation regulation case. Exploring the divergent views ex-
87 Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182 (3rd Cir. 1984). 
88 /d. at 187-88. 
89 Daley, 324 S.E.2d 722-25. 
90 /d. at 725 (quoting Pushinsky v. Bd. of Law Examiners, 164 W. Va. 736, 745, 266 S.E.2d 
444, 449 (1980)). 
91 !d. at 726. 
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pressed in Daley and Pennsylvania Alliance, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was 
correct and invalidated the ordinance because it failed to employ 
less restrictive alternatives.92 In City of Watseka v. Illinois Public 
Action Council,93 decided in 1986, the Seventh Circuit reiterated its 
commitment to tight first amendment scrutiny, again relying on 
Daley. 94 Faced with this barrage, the Third Circuit apparently changed 
its stance in New Jersey Citizens Action v. Edison Transp. 95 There, 
citing Daley and the Seventh Circuit determinations,96 the court in-
validated a local ordinance because it provided for "no alternative 
channels of communication that adequately serve their important 
First Amendment rights."97 Accordingly, the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals effort at state constitutional interpretation in Daley 
seems to have worked to alter the federal courts' vision of the First 
Amendment. 
III. CoNCLUSION 
This anecdotal portrait hardly says all that there is to say about 
the work of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Consti-
tutional interpretation is but a part of the court's duty, and state 
constitutional interpretation makes up only a segment of even that 
effort. Moreover, the court's aggressive use of judicial power98 and 
its "flexible"99 attitude toward precedent should not be discounted 
as causes for concern. My point is simply that the justices' "frequent 
recurrence to fundamental principles" 100 represents a significant con-
tribution to constitutional development both within and without the 
state's borders. That is, of course, as it should be. It was aggressive 
92 Wisconsin Action Coalition v. City of Kenosha, 767 F.2d 1248, 1254-58 (7th Cir. 1985). 
93 City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1986). 
94 Id. at 1553. 
9
' New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison Township, 797 F.2d 1250 (3rd Cir. 1986). 
96 Id. at 1255. 
97 Id. at 1262. 
93 See, e.g., State ex rei. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rockefeller, 167 W.Va. 72,281 S.E.2d 131 (1981)(granting 
writ of mandamus overturning governor's reduction of expenditures for public education). 
99 Compare, for example, the court's description of liberty interests in Major v. DeFrench, 286 
S.E.2d 688 (W. Va. 1982) with that in Freeman v. Poling, 338 S.E.2d 415 (W. Va. 1985). 
"" The language is George Mason's-set forth in Virginia's 1776 Declaration of Rights. See VA. 
CONST. art. I, § 15. 
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state court experimentation, it will be recalled, which resulted in the 
practice of judicial review in the first place. 101 It is true that the 
strains of politics and the pressures of the times have their effects 
on this tribunal like any other. But as Walter Lippman claimed, the 
boundaries of liberty are measured only by seeking them in the main 
business of human life - not in the "creation of abstract theo-
rists."102 And if the business of life is stirred by conflict and con-
troversy, occasionally the judiciary's efforts to enliven the grand 
guarantees of our fundamental charters will rankle as well. Con-
stitutional decisionmaking, in this country, is a multi-faceted en-
terprise. It is heartening to note that sometimes significant players 
live right in the neighborhood. 
101 See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (1 Call) 5, 8 (1782)("Nay more, if the whole legislature, 
an event to be deprecated, should attempt to overleap the bounds, prescribed to them by the people, 
I, in administering the public justice of the country, will meert (sic) the united powers, at my seat 
in this tribunal; and, pointing to the constitution, will say, to them, here is the limit of your authority; 
and hither shall you go, but no farther."-George Wythe). 
102 \V. LIPPMAN, THE EssENTIAL LIPPMAN, 230 (1963). 

